US Pressure, UNSC Ban & China Angle: Analysing Pakistan’s Move to Postpone Taliban Visit
As per sources, Pakistan was unable to obtain the necessary United Nations Security Council (UNSC) travel exemption that would have permitted the Taliban leaders to lawfully enter the country.
In a major diplomatic shift, Pakistan has deferred the planned visit of a senior Afghan Taliban delegation just hours ahead of their expected arrival in Islamabad.
The team, led by Afghanistan’s interim foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and interim interior minister Siraj-Ud-Din Haqqani, was slated to arrive in Pakistan on Monday for a three-day visit. The agenda included boosting bilateral relations, addressing cross-border militancy, and seeking peaceful resolutions to prevailing tensions in the region.
The sudden postponement was officially explained as due to unspecified “technical reasons.” However, top-level diplomatic sources in both Islamabad and Kabul informed CNN-News18 that the actual causes are linked to global political pressure—mainly from the United States—and hurdles related to UNSC travel sanctions imposed on both Muttaqi and Haqqani.
Sources revealed that Pakistan was unsuccessful in acquiring the necessary UNSC travel waiver, which is required for Taliban officials to enter the country legally. Under UNSC Resolution 1988, both ministers are sanctioned individuals facing travel bans because of their links with the Taliban administration. Although Muttaqi has previously been granted temporary exemptions to travel to countries like Qatar, China, and Turkey, the waiver process is intricate and requires approval from the UN sanctions committee, where any member nation can raise an objection.
In this instance, intelligence and diplomatic officials claim that the US raised a “red flag,” effectively blocking the waiver request. Washington remains cautious about allowing Taliban officials any form of international legitimacy through official visits—especially those involving Pakistan, which the US considers a significant player in South Asian strategic affairs.
Moreover, one source told CNN-News18 that the “China angle” may have influenced Washington’s decision to oppose the Taliban visit. The source referred to increasing trilateral cooperation between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, particularly after recent three-party discussions in June, which the US is believed to view as a budding regional alliance aimed at reducing its own influence in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific.
The Taliban leaders had been officially invited by Pakistan’s foreign minister Ishaq Dar during his trip to Kabul in May. The proposed Islamabad dialogue was expected to focus on a wide range of topics: enhancing trade relations, managing Afghan refugee issues in Pakistan, counterterrorism strategies, and most notably, addressing the growing threat from the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—a proscribed militant outfit ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban, responsible for several deadly assaults within Pakistan over the past year.
The Taliban leadership had shown keen interest in settling the TTP matter through jirgas—traditional tribal negotiations involving community elders—which they believed could establish long-term peace along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This method had reportedly received support from a section of Islamabad’s policymakers who consider military operations alone insufficient to tackle the issue.
Sources further stated that Muttaqi and Haqqani were to meet Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and senior security personnel during the now-delayed visit. The discussions aimed to lay the foundation for deeper cooperation on border security, economic collaboration, and humanitarian concerns.
For Kabul, the scrapped visit signifies a missed chance to strengthen diplomatic ties with a crucial neighbour at a time when the Taliban administration is facing global isolation, a deepening economic crisis, and rising internal unrest. For Islamabad, it highlights the delicate balancing act of engaging with Afghanistan’s de facto rulers while managing the expectations of global powers—particularly the United States.
The inability to carry out the visit could also add further stress to Pakistan’s internal security scenario. The TTP has increased its militant activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and tribal regions. Islamabad has repeatedly accused Kabul of ignoring the group’s hideouts inside Afghanistan. The Taliban, on the other hand, continue to assert that they do not permit Afghan territory to be used against any other nation—an assurance that is increasingly doubted within Pakistan’s security establishment.
No fresh date has been confirmed for the postponed visit, and it is yet to be seen whether Pakistan will again pursue a UNSC waiver or shift to conducting future talks through discreet diplomatic channels or in a neutral third country.
These developments reflect the fragile and sensitive nature of diplomacy in post-US Afghanistan, where each engagement is heavily scrutinised and often swayed by major international actors. Though the Taliban now hold military control of Afghanistan, their pursuit of international acceptance and regional cooperation remains a significant challenge.
